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Abstract 
Foreign currency loans (FCL) have been commonly used in many developing countries in Europe since 2005-2006. In particular, 
they were granted to retail clients to finance purchasing of real estate. As interest rates in many Central and Eastern European 
countries were permanently higher than in Switzerland and the Eurozone, the domestic as well as foreign owned banks had started 
to sell mortgages in foreign currencies, predominately in Swiss francs and euros. Due to reduced interest such loans turned out to 
be substantially cheaper and easier to get than loans denominated in domestic currencies. In fact within 2-3 years they gained a 
substantial and in some cases dominant share in domestic credit markets of CEE. Because repayment of FCL is strictly dependent 
on the exchange rate of foreign currencies, the considered loans had exposed a large group of domestic borrowers to fx risk which 
they could not effectively hedge. Such risk became very serious in countries like Poland and Hungary with a clear floating exchange 
rate regime and substantial share of FCL among bank assets. As far back as 2008, and then in 2011 the fx risk related to such loans 
strongly materialised due to an unexpected rise of the valuation of the CHF and to a lesser extent the EUR. 
The goal of this paper is to present the phenomenon of using foreign currency loans in Poland and Hungary for purchasing real 
estate where such loans concentrate a substantial share of banking assets. The authors will present the nature, conditions and 
premises of taking such loans and will use a comparative analysis between Poland and Hungary. The paper will also contain an 
analysis of the influence of such loans on borrowers, banking sectors and systemic risk in both countries. The authors will provide 
statistical analysis of the exchange rate of PLN and HUF to present the potential of fx risk of FCL. Finally the paper will describe 
legal and financial supervision solutions applied in both countries to diminish the risks related to the loans. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of IISES-International Institute for Social and Economics Sciences. 
Keywords: Foreign currency; loans; risk 
1. Introduction 
The goal of this paper is to present the phenomenon of using foreign currency loans (FCL) in Poland and Hungary 
by non-banking borrowers (households) for housing and consumption purposes. Such countries were chosen due to 
the substantial share of such loans (especially CHF-denominated mortgages) in total banking sector assets and due to 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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using the clear floating exchange rate regime in both countries, which exposes them in particular to systemic risk. In 
the paper we will present the nature, conditions and premises of taking such loans and will use a comparative analysis 
between Poland and Hungary. The paper will also contain an analysis of the influence of such loans on borrowers, 
banking sectors and systemic risk in both countries. We will present also statistics of the exchange rate of PLN and 
HUF to describe the potential of fx risk of foreign currencies loans. Finally the paper will enclose legal and financial 
supervision solutions applied in both countries to diminish the risks related to the loans.  
2. The phenomenon of foreign currency loans 
FCL have been used commonly in many developing countries in Europe since the period 2004-2005. Their 
increasing importance made that different aspects of such loans started to be investigated and presented in the 
literature. Yesin (2013), Szpunar (2012) and Buszko (2012; 2013) described the process of the development of such 
loans and their influence on borrowers, banking sectors and systemic risk creation. The currency mismatch problem 
related to such loans and risks related to foreign currency funding in banks were investigated by Pann et al. (2010), 
Brown et al. (2009), Basso et al. (2007) and Luca and Petrova (2008). Buszko (2014) analysed the cost effectiveness 
of using FCL by borrowers in Poland. As a rule in CEE countries such loans were granted to retail clients to finance 
the purchase of real estate. The major premises of the development of such loans were substantial disparity of interest 
rates linked with increasing salaries and good perspectives of future employment as well as unmet demand on 
residential real estate in CEE. Other important factor supporting taking mortgage loans in foreign currencies was  long-
term stable valuation of domestic currencies and their appreciation versus CHF and EUR as well as an expectation of 
joining the Eurozone in the near future. The demand on mortgages in foreign currencies was easily met by commercial 
banks operating in CEE countries as they had relatively good access to interbank funding on international financial 
markets. As in the majority of mentioned countries banking sectors had been characterised by substantial or even a 
dominant share of foreign credit institutions, hence the supply of foreign currencies were often provided within the 
capital group of parent banks. The fast economic development of most CEE countries also allowed local banks to 
finance domestic loans abroad and offer mortgage loans in CHF or EUR. Such loans turned out to be beneficial for 
banking sectors, as banks could make various types of profits due to them.  
As, at the beginning of the21st century interest rates in many CEE countries were permanently higher than in 
Switzerland and the Eurozone, the foreign as well as domestic banks started to sell foreign currencies mortgages, 
predominately in Swiss francs and euros. The low interest of FCL was raising creditworthiness of borrowers in foreign 
currencies against the domestic currency, as well as making such loans more accessible. Due to the reduced value of 
instalments of FCL this allowed people to buy real estate properties of a larger size and higher value. Within 3 to 4 
years such loans gained a substantial share in many domestic banking sectors. In fact, as CHF and EUR supply was 
out of the competence of monetary authorities of CEE countries, the inflow of money from FCL had bypassed local 
monetary policies and inflated real estate property prices at a rate essentially higher than in Western Europe. In the 
period 2005-2008 in most of the CEE an increase in prices of apartments and houses was noted at levels never met in 
the past. FCL loans became vitally responsible for a housing boom and unreasonable valuation of real estate property 
on local markets. The highest rise of prices was in the Baltic States, then in Poland and the lowest in Hungary, Czech 
Rep. and Slovakia. 
Because FCL were financed primarily from the international interbank market but not domestic deposits they 
quickly created liquidity, capital adequacy, refinancing, foreign exchange (fx) as well as a foreign interest rate risk for 
whole banking sectors in countries where the considered loans gained a substantial share.  
As the FCL to private borrowers were usually paid out and repaid in domestic currencies, they required currency 
conversion during disbursement and during repayment of instalments. Such a solution implied that borrowers became 
dependent on the exchange rate of foreign currencies as well as the change of costs of foreign currencies. Under the 
floating rate regime of the domestic currency and the variable interest rates of the loans, borrowers had been exposed 
directly to fx risk and the foreign interest rate risk which in turn might be converted into a credit risk for banks. Fx 
risk and FCL segment, became a subject of particular concern especially in countries like Poland and Hungary i.e. 
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countries with the clear floating exchange rate regime, where FCL has got a dominant share in the total bank assets 
and where most of the loans were given in Swiss francs. In Hungary CHF loans reached 10,6% of GDP, in Poland 
7,4% (National Bank of Romania, 2015).  
The problem of fx risk has materialised quite fast in Poland and Hungary after the strong development of FCL in 
2004-2010. As far back as 2008, and then in 2011 the exchange rate of CHF/PLN and CHF/HUF rose significantly 
from historically minimum levels when most of the loans were granted. Such a trend severely struck the value of 
instalments of FCL borrowers. The Hungarian government together with the National Bank of Hungary (MNB) and 
banks implemented plans of obligatory conversion of fx-denominated loans into domestic currency as more and more 
borrowers had problems with repayment. The Polish government, the National Bank of Poland (NBP) and the Polish 
Financial Supervision Authority (PFSA) up until 2015 did not provide any special programmes of recovery as CHF-
denominated loans have been better performing than PLN-denominated. Dropping the peg of CHF against EUR in 
January 2015 became another critical point for CEE borrowers. As loans in Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
were granted mostly in euro, some part of Croatian CHF loans were forcibly converted into local currencies in 2013 
and the Hungarian government forced banks granting CHF FCL to convert them into forints at CHF/HUF exchange 
rates pegged below market price, Poland became the only CEE country particularly exposed to the appreciation of 
CHF. 
3. Foreign currency loans premises in Poland and Hungary 
The spreading out of the foreign exchange loans in Poland and Hungary, as in other countries of CEE was mostly 
motivated by a significantly lower level of interest rates compared to Switzerland or the Eurozone. The CEE countries 
are classified as emerging markets, hence their rate of growth of GDP and inflation is expected to be higher than in 
well-developed countries. The European Central Bank (ECB) as well as the Swiss National Bank (SNB) assume as 
price stability a rise in CPI of less than 2% per annum, while ECB defines the medium term target level as “below, but 
close to 2%”. CEE countries central banks accept usually higher medium-term target inflation levels. The National 
Bank of Poland (NBP) tends to keep CPI at 2,5% with possible deviation +/- 1% and the National Bank of Hungary 
(MNB) set an average of 3%. In both cases the inflation target level is concise with international practice, however it 
is higher than accepted for countries of the Eurozone and Switzerland due to the necessity of catching-up to the level 
of development and wealth. The consequence of such a policy is a raised level of inflation linked with accelerated 
growth of economy. Figure 1 and 2 present the interest rate disparity of PLN and HUF versus CHF and EUR. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Interest rate disparity NBP and MNB vs. SNB 
Source: own work based on central bank data 
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Fig. 2. Interest rate disparity NBP and MNB vs. ECB 
Source: own work based on central bank data 
An important condition supporting decisions of taking loans in foreign currencies in Poland and Hungary was also 
the increasing valuation of the Hungarian forint and Polish zloty toward Swiss francs and euros. In the period 2004-
2008 both currencies were clearly appreciating versus CHF and EUR until their maximum rate in July 2008 (Figure 
3).  
 
 
Fig. 3. Relative pricing of EUR and CHF 
Source: own elaboration based on MNB and NBP data 
Such a long-term trend, although leading to a reduction of the efficiency of new FCL, had increased belief in 
stability of local currencies and even more convinced individuals in Hungary and Poland to borrow francs and euros. 
During the most intensive credit period, i.e. the second and third quarter of 2008, the exchange rate was particularly 
unfavourable for borrowers and led them to borrow higher amounts of capital to buy real estates at already inflated 
prices. After the outbreak of the subprime crisis linked with a high long-term depreciation of local currencies, 
borrowers that took loans around historical minimal valuation of CHF and EUR became the first exposed to losses. 
Table 1 presents statistics of daily change of rates of PLN and HUF indicating risks related to fx borrowings. 
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Table 1. Statistics of foreign exchange risk (daily changes) for HUF and PLN (2004-2014) 
Category EUR/HUF CHF/HUF EUR/PLN CHF/PLN 
Average 0,009% 0,020% -0,001% 0,009% 
Average of absolute 
change 0,445% 0,569% 0,421% 0,551% 
St. Dev. 0,647% 0,864% 0,625% 0,840% 
Median -0,004% 0,000% -0,018% -0,020% 
Max. Rate 5,930% 7,749% 4,060% 5,844% 
Min. Rate -4,075% -8,158% -4,486% -7,506% 
Rate of change 40,5% 86,9% 53,5% 101,9% 
Coeff of variation 7,92% 19,26% 7,328% 15,926% 
Source: own elaboration upon data of NBP and MNB 
In both countries the volatility of the CHF rate was very high and vitally higher than that of EUR. That influenced 
a very high rate of change between the minimum and maximum rate between 2004 and 2014. The general development 
of fx loans in Poland and Hungary under specified exchange rate conditions is presented in Table 2.   
 
Table 2. Fx loans and other loans in Poland and Hungary (bln euro, %) 
All data expressed in euro using median exchange rate for 2008-2013 EUR/PLN = 4,10 and EUR/HUF = 270 
Source: own elaboration upon data of Polish Financial Supervision Authority and Magyar Nemzeti Bank 
Country Poland Hungary 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Fx mortgage loans 33,2 34,6 41,3 48,3 43,5 39,5 8,7 8,8 10,5 9,8 7 6,5 
CHF and other fx 32,2 32,4 36 39,9 35,3 33,1 8,5 8 9,5 8,8 6,2 5,7 
EUR  0,7 1,9 4,8 7,8 7,6 7,4 0,2 0,8 0,9 1 0,9 0,8 
Fx loans to HH 36,5 37,8 45,1 52,3 46,9 44,2 18,7 17,8 21 20,1 14,8 13,5 
Fx mortgage loans in
total fx loans to HH 90,9% 91,7% 91,6% 92,4% 92,9% 89,4% 46,6% 49,2% 49,7% 48,7% 47,6% 48,3% 
Mortgage loans in
total 47,6 53,2 65,3 77,8 78,5 80,2 14 13,8 15,6 15,2 12,6 12 
Fx mortgage loans in
total mortgage loans 69,7% 65,4% 63,2% 62,1% 55,4% 49,3% 62,4% 63,7% 66,9% 64,2% 55,6% 54,4% 
Loans to HH 89,9 100,6 116 129,8 130,1 135,5 26,5 25,5 29,1 29,6 24,9 23,6 
Fx loans to HH 
40,6% 37,5% 38,9% 40,3% 36,0% 32,6% 70,7% 69,9% 72,4% 67,8% 59,4% 57,2% 
in total loans to HH 
Fx mortgage loans in
total loans to HH 36,9% 34,4% 35,6% 37,2% 33,5% 29,2% 32,9% 34,4% 36,0% 33,0% 28,3% 27,6% 
Total loans 159,4 174,1 192,1 222,2 228,1 237,3 73,6 67,4 71 69,2 57,5 53,4 
Fx mortgage loans in
total loans  20,8% 19,9% 21,5% 21,7% 19,1% 16,2% 11,9% 13,0% 14,7% 14,1% 12,2% 12,2% 
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4. Reference rate and cost of borrowing 
As it was stated before, the prime reason for taking the FCL in Hungary and Poland was a large disparity amongst 
the interest rates of domestic currencies and Swiss francs and euros.  
In Hungary a substantial part of the FCL was given for other purposes than housing hence such loans had fixed 
interest, which is typical practice for consumption borrowing. On the other hand, the long-term housing or home equity 
loans were indexed by the individual decision of banks upon the assessment of credit risk and cost of money at the 
interbank market. As FCL loans started to spread out in Hungary in 2004, borrowers could take advantage of the lower 
interest rate and non-volatile exchange rate of CHF/HUF until the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008. In 
Poland borrowers took advantage of the low interest from 2005-2006. Due to the sharp appreciation of Swiss francs, 
which became commonly treated as a safe haven currency during times of turbulence and increased risk on financial 
markets (Ranaldo and Söderlind, 2007), the position of borrowers taking FCL had changed drastically in scope of their 
ability to repay debt as well as cost efficiency of their borrowings. As the CHF/HUF started to rise and the interest 
rates of loans remained fixed or in some cases became elevated due to a higher interest rate risk (despite a decrease of 
LIBOR rate), the ability of borrowers to repay had been decreasing, determining the level of all non-performing CHF 
loans at 26,4% in 2013 and 22,1% in 2014 (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 2015). The interest rates for CHF housing 
(mortgage) loans in the peak period were oscillating in the range 4%-5%. After the commencement of the subprime 
crisis, banks increased their interest by approx. 1 p.p., and such an elevated cost was maintained in the next years 
despite decreasing interest rates in Switzerland. Such a phenomenon was opposite to the practice in Poland where the 
interest of loans in CHF was decreasing altogether with a fall of LIBOR CHF rate. 
FCL in Poland were mostly taken for housing purposes, especially for the purchase of constructing of real estate. 
In 2013 CHF-denominated loans maintained a share of 41,3% value of all housing loans in Poland and 31,8% of 
volume. That constituted 81,3% of value and 83% of volume of all housing loans granted in foreign currencies. From 
the beginning of the development of fx loans in Poland, a typical practice was to offer loans indexed with an interbank 
market reference rate (WIBOR, LIBOR, EURIBOR) supplemented by a fixed spread (margin). As a result, borrowers 
have to repay variable interest on their debt. Such a solution exposes them to the current change of exchange rate as 
well as interest rate, but also this can be treated as a factor of stabilisation of repayment. As most of the fx-denominated 
loans were taken in 2007-2008 period, borrowers got the disbursement exchanged at the historically low pricing of 
CHF. Thus, after the beginning of the financial crisis they were exposed in particular to losses due to the appreciation 
of the Swiss or euro currency. As together with the appreciation of CHF and EUR, SNB and ECB reduced the interest 
rates, what was reflected in reduction of LIBOR CHF and EURIBOR, the risks related to FCL were in a large part 
compensated. Figure 4 and 5 present the value of instalments of 20-years CHF-denominated loan (principal 100.000 
zł - approx. 24.000 euro, interest rate WIBOR 3M, LIBOR CHF 3M, credit spread 2%) against instalments of PLN-
denominated loan on two key dates of borrowings - July 2008 and February 2009, i.e. before and after the subprime 
crisis. 
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Fig. 4. Instalments of CHF and PLN-denominated loans taken in 08.2008 
Source: own work based on NBP data 
 
Fig. 5. Instalments of CHF and PLN-denominated loans taken in 02.2009 
Source: own work based on NBP data 
Both figures confirm that despite a very high increase valuation of CHF (by more than 100% from the moment of 
disbursement of the loan) an increase of instalments value was in a large part compensated. 
5. Quality of loans 
The abrupt rise of the exchange rate of CHF/HUF and EUR/HUF strongly influenced the level of non-performing 
loans in the banking sector in Hungary and to a lesser extent in Poland. As in Hungary the fx loans were often granted 
for other than housing purposes, their influence on stability of the whole banking sector is much more crucial than in 
Poland. In general, in Hungary we might observe an elevated level of non-performing fx loans which was firstly a 
result of their common accessibility for borrowers as well as their purpose. As a significant share of fx loans in Hungary 
had been used for consumption purposes- which as a rule are more risky than housing, hence Hungary had been 
denoting a relatively high level of non-performing fx loans. 
As, in Poland fx loans were granted to households mostly for housing purposes, their performance had been rather 
good and had not threatened the whole banking sector. A better quality of loans in Poland than in Hungary can be 
explained partially by implementation of Recommendation S (Rekomendacja S), which limited the access to fx loans 
to persons having higher credit ability as well as by the indexing of the loans with variable LIBOR reference rate. 
Figure 6 and 7 present NPL ratio of housing fx-denominated loans in Hungary and Poland versus domestic housing 
loans.  
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Fig. 6. Non-performing housing loans ratio in Hungary 
Source: own work based on MNB data 
 
Fig. 7. Non-performing housing loans ratio in Poland 
Source: own work based on NBP data 
In both countries non-performing housing loans concentrate different shares and have a relatively different impact 
on banking sectors and their financial results. In Hungary the non-performing housing loans ratio is relatively high 
and strongly variable since 2011, which is a result of the Hungarian government and central bank programs of systemic 
risk management (in particular in 2011, 2014). In Poland NPL ratio for fx mortgage loans is relatively low and confirms 
relatively high quality of such loans amongst all other loans in the banking sector (e.g. in period 2011-2013 the 
consumption NPL ratio amounted to 18,0%, 17,2% and 14,6 %, the corporate NPL ratio was 7,4%, 9,8%, 9,3%, SME 
loans NPL ratio was: 12,3%, 13,1% and 13,0%.  The overall housing NPL ratio was at that time 2,3%, 2,8% and 3,1% 
confirming relatively good quality of long-term borrowings independently on the currency of loans. The reason of a 
low level of NPL ratio of fx mortgages in Poland is in the majority a relatively stable level of instalments due to a 
decrease of the reference rate LIBOR CHF and the priority of repayment of such loans due to a high level of LtV ratio. 
We want to underline that despite relatively good but slightly deteriorating quality of fx loans, their main risk is related 
to a strongly excessive level of LtV ratio of such loans which makes borrowers unable to repay (on 31.12.2014) if the 
loans are terminated before their initial maturity. 
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6. Profile of borrowers 
As a rule FCL in Hungary were commonly available to any type of borrowers having credit ability to repay at the 
moment of disbursement until the official ban of foreign currency lending in July 2010. Such a solution in Hungary 
was implemented due to an extraordinarily high share of FCL loans to households in total loans to households 
(reaching approx. 70%) and due to a high appreciation of foreign currencies, especially CHF, in which currency, 
approx. 91% of all FCL to households were denominated. In November 2014 the National Assembly in Hungary 
passed a law ordering all borrowers to convert fx instalments into HUF, which was preceding total conversion of FCL 
from the beginning of 2015. Based on such a solution all the loans granted in foreign currencies (CHF and EUR) are 
going to be paid back in HUF at fixed exchange rate 256,60 and 308,97. Just the borrowers receiving regular inflows 
in foreign currencies in which they have loans and under the condition of having higher interest on loans after the 
conversion into HUF got an option to keep the FCL instead of “forintisation”. The ban on using FCL in Hungary has 
been lifted for borrowers receiving regular incomes in CHF or EUR of 15 times the national minimum wage converted 
into loan currency.  
In Poland, since 2005, the FCL could be taken by any kind of borrower able to repay it at the time of disbursement. 
In fact until 2007 the CHF-denominated loans were also used by low-income borrowers, which due to higher 
instalments of PLN-denominated loans could not afford to repay them in domestic currency. In July 2006 the Polish 
Banking Supervision Authority implemented Recommendation S (Komisja Nadzoru Bankowego, 2006), which 
limited the availability of CHF-denominated loans to upper and high-income borrowers. Such a solution was 
introduced in Poland to protect borrowers and then creditors against possible fx risk. In fact Recommendation S was 
implemented about two years before peak development of FCL in Poland, which vitally kept the stability of the 
banking sector during the crisis and then during the strong appreciation of the CHF against the PLN. Recommendation 
S imposed the requirement of offering in the first place, loans in PLN and then in FCL. The granting of the loan in a 
foreign currency required signing by the borrower a statement of understanding and accepting of fx risk and foreign 
currency interest rates risk. Moreover, the creditworthiness of the borrower had to be assessed under the assumption 
that the loan value is increased by 20% than the face value and the interest rate of foreign currency is equal to Polish 
zloty rate. Also, banks required from borrowers 20% of equity when buying real estate using loan co-financing (<80% 
of LtV). The implementation of Recommendation S reduced the group of potential borrowers to the medium and high-
income borrowers, which was reflected in the relatively limited growth of the total value of such loans between 2006 
and 2007. In consequence the CHF-denominated loans were then used to buy a rather high value real estate property. 
Also, their average value was higher than the average value of PLN loans (in 2013 36,1 thous. euro for PLN loans, 
58,8 thous. euro for CHF loans). According to the research of PFSA in 2011, the highest number of loans was taken 
either in PLN or foreign currencies by the borrowers receiving net incomes between 2.000 and 4.000 zloty (approx. 
490-980 euro), however in general FCL usually were taken by persons having higher incomes (Figure 8). Also taking 
FCL primarily by medium and high-income borrowers is confirmed by the relation of debt (instalment) to the monthly 
net income of the borrowers (DtI) (Figure 9). 
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Fig. 8. Breakdown of housing loans in Poland according to net income of borrowers 
Source: own work based on data of PFSA 
 
Fig. 9. Breakdown of housing loans in Poland according to DtI ratio of borrowers 
Source: own work based on data of PFSA 
Since 2012 FCL were strongly limited in the Polish banking sector but from July 2014, based upon the amended 
Recommendation S such loans are granted only to borrowers receiving regular, stable income in foreign currency. 
They are unavailable in Poland for borrowers having income in zloty except households receiving 12-15 thousand 
zloty of net income per month (approx. quadruple of the average monthly salary in Poland). Amongst foreign 
currencies available for credit, the prime currency is euro. USD and GBP are used occasionally. New CHF-
denominated loans are not offered in Poland. After Recommendation S regulations, Polish borrowers obtaining income 
in foreign currencies cannot apply for loans in PLN. 
7. Counteractions towards risk 
In Hungary in July 2010 a law was passed prohibiting fx lending, however in 2011 the law was banned due to being 
contradictory to EU regulations and limiting access to financing by fx earning persons. The only persons eligible for 
fx-denominated loans became borrowers obtaining monthly income in the currency of the loan at the value of 15 times 
of the statutory minimal monthly wage (Government Decree, 2009). According to the same Decree the LtV ratio at 
the time of commitment of exposure shall not exceed 60% in the case of loans denominated in EUR and 45% in other 
currencies. The assessment of creditworthiness of private persons upon pure collateral of the loans has been banned. 
The same regulation implemented the thresholds for DtI ratio at 80% for loans denominated in EUR and 60% 
denominated in other currencies. According to Act CXII of 1996 on credit institutions (The Act CXII, 1996) and 
financial enterprises, monthly repayments of loans denominated in foreign currencies shall be calculated at the middle 
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exchange rate of the lending bank or MNB to protect the customers against bid-offer spread costs. The same act 
specifies that lending institutions must expressly specify in the contract the risks of fluctuation of exchange rates and 
monthly instalments of loans. Also, from 2012 financial institutions shall make precise the rules of changing the 
interest rate of mortgage loans (using a reference interest rate EURIBOR, LIBOR or by fixing the interest rate for a 3-
year, 5-year or 10-year period). In Hungary new regulations were implemented to manage the problem of increasing 
debt of borrowers due to the appreciation of CHF versus HUF. The major solutions proposed for the borrowers were 
as follows: repayment of foreign currency loans at a fixed preferential exchange rate, conversion of FX mortgage loans 
into HUF-denominated loans, the government-backed exchange rate fixing scheme, quota system for foreclosure, 
establishing the National Asset Management Company and the subsidised interest rates (Hungarian Financial 
Supervisory Authority, 2015). E.g. In 2011 borrowers had the possibility to the repay instalments on CHF and EUR-
denominated loans at fixed exchange rates of respectively CHF/HUF = 180 and EUR/HUF = 250 (compared to market 
rates of 220 and 268). Primarily borrowers had to repay the difference between the rates after a 3-year period but in 
2013 the National Assembly voted for a permanent fixed-rate repayment schedule. In December 2011, following the 
abrupt appreciation of CHF and EUR, borrowers got the option of repaying their fx loans at the mentioned rates by 
March 2012. Banks could deduct one-third of the exchange-rate losses from their payment of the financial sector tax. 
Approx. 170 thousand Hungarians repaid approximately HUF 1,354 billion in fx loans at a fixed rate, which constituted 
24.1% of the value of fx loans (Index, 2012). In 2014 there was a new law implemented allowing repayment of 
instalments of all fx mortgage loans beginning on January 1st, 2015 at the fixed rate CHF/HUF and EUR/HUF of the 
National Bank of Hungary registered on November 7th, 2014, i.e. 256.60 and 308.97.   
In Poland PFSA, the National Bank of Poland and the government of Poland provided some legal instruments 
counteracting the problem of increased risk related to FCL. In fact none of the solutions granted the right to repay the 
loan at the fixed exchange rate CHF/PLN below the market pricing. The legal instruments were mostly created for 
CHF/PLN borrowers as EUR-denominated loans were very minor and they were taken at the end of 2008 when the 
first symptoms of problems with CHF supply and CHF/PLN rate appreciation appeared. In fact in 2005 the risks 
related to Fx loans were identified. As a consequence Recommendation S, required assessment of credit worthiness at 
120% of the value of fx loan at the assumption of the interest rate equal to domestic was implemented in July 2006. 
After that change, due to political action, the competences of the Polish Banking Supervision Authority were taken 
over by the Polish Financial Supervision Authority in 2008. Another solution counteracting the fx risk in Poland was 
changing the weights of risk for fx mortgage loans from 35% to 75% (in 2007), then from 75% up to 100% in 2012. 
In July 2009 there was the implemented Recommendation SII (Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego, 2011), which gave the 
possibility to repay the loan in the original currency of the fx loan. Banks were obliged also to inform clients about 
the level of fx spread and the conditions of its change. On July 29th 2011 there was a voted amendment to the banking 
act, which gave the possibility of a free of charge change of repayment of fx loans from PLN to original currency of 
the loan. Banks were also obligated to open fx accounts to their clients which wanted to repay the loans in original 
currencies.  Banks couldn’t determine the place of purchasing currency for the purpose of repayment of fx loans. 
Banks also couldn’t take fees for repayment of the loan in the original currency of the loan. In 2013 there was 
implemented Recommendation T (Rekomendacja T, Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego, 2013), which limited the credit 
level of borrowers (DtI) to 50% of monthly incomes (latterly the ratio was abolished). In 2011-2012 the Polish 
Financial Supervisory Authority instructed particular banks to limit the fx loans expansion. The amendment of 2013 
imposed conditions of granting fx loans only to persons having major incomes in foreign currencies. No supporting 
programs were implemented after cessation of the floor rate of EUR/CHF at 1,20 by SNB.  
8. Comparison of fx loans Poland vs. Hungary 
The phenomenon of using fx loans in Poland and Hungary has similar roots and influence on the creation of risk to 
borrowers and the development of banking sectors in both countries. The difference is visible in effects and 
consequences as well as legal actions toward solving problems of excessive risk related to such loans in both countries. 
Table 3 summarises the comparison of fx loans between both countries. 
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Table 3. Comparison of fx lending conditions in Poland and Hungary 
Category Poland Hungary 
Period of development 2005-2011 2004-2010 
Purpose of loans Housing Housing, vehicle and personal  
Borrowers Primarily with higher income (since 
2006) 
All having eligible creditworthiness 
Interest calculation Variable interest calculated as 
LIBOR CHF 3M or EUBIBOR 3M 
+ credit risk spread 
Fixed or variable but not directly 
indexed with LIBOR or EURIBOR 
reference rate 
Major currencies of fx loans Primarily CHF, then EUR (EUR-
denominated loans spreading 
between 2010-2013) 
Dominance of CHF and to lesser 
extent EUR 
Exchange rate regime Fully floating Fully floating 
Repayment In PLN or in foreign currency In HUF 
   
Special LtV limits for fx loans Yes Yes 
Fixed fx rate repayment plan No Yes 
Conversion of currency of loan 
before maturity  
Possible at current exchange rate Possible at fixed exchange rate  
Quality of loans High Low 
Systemic risk High Reduced after conversion plans in 
2012 and 2015 
Governmental programs of 
protection of borrowers 
No Yes 
Peak period of fx loans development 2007-2008 2007-2008 
Period of benefits of fx loans due to 
favorable exchange or interest rate. 
2007-2008 2004-2008 
Source: own elaboration 
9. Conclusions 
Fx loans in the CEE countries are quite a common form of lending. Until the subprime crisis, such loans, taken 
mostly in Swiss francs, became quite a safe and stable source of financing. The highest level of exposure to borrowers 
as well as banking sectors to fx and foreign currency interest rate risk was noted in Hungary and Poland, i.e. countries 
with a free floating currency exchange regime. Due to the lowest level of interest rates the major borrowing currency 
became CHF but not EUR, which has been a reference currency for Poland as well as Hungary. Thus, banking sectors 
in both countries had been exposed to elevated risk related to unbalanced cash flows (short currency position in both 
countries). After analysing the fx loans phenomenon in both countries we may say that the crucial point in creation of 
risk was easy access to loans and lack of formal restrictions in obtaining CHF-financing despite lack of relevant inflows 
of Swiss currency in both economies. The dominance of the CHF-denominated loans is unfavorable in banking sectors 
due to the higher volatility and exchange risk of Swiss currency in relation to domestic currencies in comparison to 
e.g. EUR. The important factor of risk in both countries is a free-floating regime, which is determining the value of 
instalments. Such risk has not been created in the countries with fixed rates of exchange toward foreign currency (e.g. 
Latvia, and Lithuania before joining the Eurozone). Fixed credit spreads in a large part, compensated fx risk in Poland 
while fixed interest rates in Hungary amplified this risk. The granting of loans at LtV equal to or exceeding 100% 
exposed borrowers to critical credit risk during the appreciation of foreign currencies. As the debt value calculated at 
the present elevated pricing of CHF is substantially higher than the real property value, the borrowers are not able to 
repay the loans if they are forced to terminate the loan. The offering of fx loans at historical minimal exchange rates 
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of foreign currencies, in particular in Poland, burdened borrowers with additional losses independently of the long-
term market pricing of the domestic currency. It made Fx loans less beneficial than in domestic currency. The value 
of equity in banking sectors either in Poland or Hungary does not cover foreign currency exposures. In case of the 
default of borrowers it would strongly influence functioning of all banks in Poland and Hungary. Due to fx loans, 
Polish and Hungarian banking sectors become less dependent on monetary policy and financial support of the National 
Bank of Poland and the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. As the borrowers are not able to convert loans at market rates to local 
currencies due to high pricing of CHF against EUR, they have to keep the risk of exchange rate unless they are 
supported by the Government and the central bank (case of Hungary). Due to lack of earnings in Swiss currency, 
Polish and Hungarian borrowers cannot use the natural hedge for exchange rate risk. The National Bank of Poland and 
Hungary as well as Financial Supervisory Authorities in both countries actively support reduction of fx mortgage 
loans, however, using different methods. 
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